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PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF SMART METERS
CHERYL DANCEY BALOUGH*
INTRODUCTION
It's 1984, Orwellian time. The telescreens are everywhere, monitoring
the intimate details of citizens' lives within their own homes. Big Brother is
watching you. Now transport yourself to 2010. Smart meters-along with
other smart devices-are being installed in homes across the country. By
measuring energy consumption by appliance every fifteen minutes, they
capture details on how you spend your days and nights. When you turn off
the lights. When you take a shower. When you leave home. Where your
electric vehicle is being charged. But who is watching you? Who has
access to all this information? The electric company? Appliance manufac-
turers? The government? The Internet? What might they do with it? Or-
well's 1984 has not come to pass, but smart meters have. This article
examines the privacy implications of smart meters and explores options for
protecting one of our most basic rights.
I. A RECENT HISTORY
On October 27, 2009, the President of the United States announced
$3.4 billion in Smart Grid Investment Grant awards-the largest group of
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act awards ever made in a single
day.' More than one hundred companies, utilities, municipalities, and other
entities in forty-two U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and Guam re-
ceived the awards, with a sizeable portion going toward expanding access
to smart meters and associated smart appliances and devices.2 Smart me-
* Cheryl Dancey Balough is a member of Balough Law Offices, LLC, a firm that focuses on
public utility, privacy, and intellectual property law. She can be contacted at cba-
lough@balough.com. The author wishes to thank Chicago-Kent College of Law Professor Fred P.
Bosselman, for his critique of the author's initial exploration of privacy issues raised by the im-
plementation of smart meters, and Richard C. Balough, for his valuable insights and editorial rec-
ommendations.
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, President Obama Announces $3.4 Billion Investment to
Spur Transition to Smart Energy Grid (October 27, 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www.energy.gov/news2009/8216.htm.
2. Id; U.S. Dep't of Energy, Recovery Act Selections For Smart Grid Investment Grant Awards -
By State, available at http://www.energy.gov/recovery/smartgridmaps/SGIGSelectionsState.pdf (last
visited Oct. 15, 2010)
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ters, which are digital meters that offer "two-way, near real time
communication" between the home and the electric utility, are a crucial
component of a smart grid.3 As of mid-2009, one research firm estimated
that smart meters represented six percent, or 8.3 million, of all electric me-
ters operating in the country.4 The U.S. Department of Energy projects that
fifty-two million more will be installed by 2012.5 In conjunction with smart
appliances, data management software, other smart devices like programm-
able communicating thermostats (PCTs), and home area networks (HANs),
the smart meters promise to provide utilities, electricity consumers, and
possibly others with rich data on electricity consumption by appliance or
type of use in thirty or fifteen-minute intervals. 6 Their goal is to help im-
prove energy efficiency based on the assumption that customers will adjust
their consumption patterns (or allow the utility to do so) if they are properly
informed with near real-time detailed information about their own electrici-
ty consumption, its cost, and comparisons to neighbors' consumption levels
while simultaneously receiving education on simple, concrete steps they
can take to reduce their electricity bills by adjusting those usage patterns.7
As the rush to install residential smart meters accelerates, some priva-
cy experts, utilities, and governmental agencies are calling for caution until
the privacy implications of smart meters can be addressed. Jules Polo-
netsky, director of the Future of Privacy Forum, emphasizes that many
utilities are "worried about fulfilling basic operational concerns and getting
meters installed and [saying], 'Well, when there's a regulator or rule I'll
worry about complying with that,' or 'when I actually want to make more
use of the data. Today I just want to get the meter installed.' "8 The ability
to get rich data from the smart meters, however, might also just be the
3. Frequently Asked Questions, SMART GRID CITY,
http://smartgridcity.xcelenergy.com/learn/frequently-asked-questions.asp (last visited July 29, 2010).
4. More than 8 Million Smart Meters installed in US, July 21, 2009, Parks Associates,
http://www.parksassociates.con/press/cited/SmartMeters.html.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT, at vi (July 2009), available at
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/SGSRMain_090707 lowres.pdf.
6. Jules Polonetsky, Privacy and the Smart Grid: New Frontiers, New Challenges, Presentation at
Privacy by Design: The Definitive Workshop, at 8 (November 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www.privacybydesign.calmadrid09/SmartGridPrivacyMadridPowerPointJPFinal.pdf.
7. See Press Release, Am. Council for an Energy-Efficient Econ., ACEEE Study Finds "Smart
Meters" Not Smart Enough to Slash Residential Power Use and Significantly Reduce Consumer Elec-
tric Bills (June 29, 2010) (on file with author), available at http://www.aceee.org/press/el05pr.htm;
Lisa Wood, Consumers Are the Key to Future Smart Energy Management 8-10, Presentation to the
Eastern New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities Current Issues 2010 conference
(March 16, 2010) (on file with author), available at
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/IssueBriefs/WoodSantaFeMarch l 0.pdf.
8. Smart Grid Elevated to Top Issue by Leading Privacy Watchdogs, SMART GRID TODAY (Dec.
17, 2009), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/1060print.cfm.
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smart grid's Achilles' heel.9 If homeowners fear that installation of smart
meters will compromise their privacy, a backlash could arise that would
stall the adoption of this promising technology along with residential par-
ticipation in the smart grid.)o "[Llack of consumer confidence in the securi-
ty and privacy of their energy consumption data" could also result in litiga-
litigation." As Elias Quinn, a Colorado Supreme Court clerk who helped
Colorado's Public Utility Commission (COPUC) conduct informational
hearings on smart grid policy, stated, "Get one really salient privacy inva-
sion that makes the front page of the New York Times and the Washington
Post and you'll bring to a dead stop smart grid development."' 2
Not all players in the smart grid industry believe that installation of
smart meters should slow down pending resolution of privacy concerns;
nonetheless, widespread concern about privacy risks associated with the
devices exists.13 As part of its responsibility to develop standards for the
smart grid, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
established a Cyber Security Working Group within a new Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel (SGIP-CSWG) with members from the "private sec-
tor. . ., academia, regulatory organizations, and federal agencies."14 NIST
and the privacy subgroup of the SGIP-CSWG conducted a privacy impact
assessment, and in September 2009, NIST issued the first draft of its Smart
Grid Cyber Security Strategy and Requirements interagency report.' 5 The
volume of comments submitted to NIST in response to the first draft ma-
nifest the widespread concern about privacy risks associated with smart
meters. The Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Center for Democ-
racy & Technology, and thirty-three other privacy groups, utilities, tech-
nology firms, and other entities involved in the burgeoning smart grid
industry filed more than 450 comments. 16
9. Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 3.
10. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY AND
REQUIREMENTS, DRAFT I - COMMENT RESOLUTION 123, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-
7628/nistir7628draft lcommentdisposition.pdf; see also PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO,
INITIAL COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO DECISION NO. C09-0878, at 4, available at
https://www.dora.state.co.us/pls/efi/EFI.ShowFiling?p session-id=&p-fil=G 12903.
11. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY AND
REQUIREMENTS, DRAFT 2 at I1I (February 2010) (on file with the law review).
12. Smart Grid Elevated to Top Issue by Leading Privacy Watchdogs, supra note 8.
13. See NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10.
14. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 1.
15. Id. at 102; NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH, supra note 10, at 1.
16. Press Release, Nat'1 Inst. of Standards and Tech., NIST Released the Second Draft of NIST




This vigorous reaction should not be a surprise. The past forty years
have seen a strong interest in controlling the collection and use of personal
information. In 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare issued its Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems, the result of the committee's study on recordkeep-
ing in the "computer age."' 7 That report, which became commonly known
as the "HEW Report," advocated "fair information practices" and formed
much of the basis for the Privacy Act of 1974.18 In the ensuing thirty-five
years, Congress passed several laws to protect information privacy, includ-
ing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 USCS § 1030), the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (18 USC §§ 2510-2522, 2701-
2709), the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (18 USC §§ 2721-
2725), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(P.L.104-191), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (15 USC §§
6801-6809). More recently, the media have reported frequently on con-
cerns of the general public about privacy on the Internet, including how
employers increasingly use voluntary posts on social media sites like Face-
book and LinkedIn to make both hiring and termination decisions.19 Social
media users themselves revolted when Facebook loosened its privacy con-
trols in December 2009 and made its users' profiles more accessible to the
public, forcing the company into a partial retreat a few months later.20
Now, privacy advocates, governmental agencies, utilities, and third
parties poised to benefit from the smart grid are struggling over how best to
address the threats to privacy inherent in smart meters. Three factors fuel
the concern of those advocating for additional, specific measures that will
protect privacy compromised by the installation of smart meters. First, the
wealth of information that smart meters and affiliated appliances and de-
vices make available can threaten both consumers' privacy within their
homes and their ability to control the distribution of their personal informa-
tion outside the home. Second, as necessary consumers of electricity,
people do not have other options. Third, despite the multiple information
17. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYSTEMS (July 1973).
18. Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History BOBGELLMAN.COM (May 13,
2010), available online at http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf.
19. Press Release, Proofpoint, Proofpoint Survey Says: State of Economy Leads to Increased Data
Loss Risk for Large Companies (August 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www.proofpoint.com/news-and-events/press-releases/pressdetail.php?PressReleaselD-2 4 5.
20. Caroline McCarthy, Do Facebook's New Privacy Settings Let It Off the Hook?, CNET NEWS
(May 26, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20006054-36.html.
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privacy laws passed in the past few decades, none of them adequately ad-
dress the new challenges to privacy posed by smart meters.
II. TYPES OF THREATS TO PRIVACY PRESENTED BY SMART METERS
Legal scholars have proposed various concepts of privacy over the
past 120 years or so, and the country's founding fathers certainly contem-
plated privacy rights when drafting the Bill of Rights. A discussion of those
concepts and their origins is beyond the scope of this article. It is important
to note, however, that the threats to privacy connected to smart meters lie
primarily within the concepts of a right to be left alone within one's home
and the right to control personal information. The first right is embedded in
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.21
The second right-to exercise control over the disclosure of personal in-
formation-has been discussed by a number of legal scholars. 22 The U.S.
Supreme Court also recognized this right in 1977 in Whalen v. Roe.23
Smart meters can compromise both of these rights. Many smart meters
are found within residences, and all of the meters, even those that are not
located within in the home itself but adjacent to an outside wall of the
house or somewhere on the home's property, record information about
what transpires within the home. Before smart meters, the only information
that utilities gathered from electric meters was the total consumption of
electricity on a monthly or less frequent basis as measured by kilowatt
hours. 24 With the new smart meters, it is not clear which and how much
information will eventually be gathered. Because each smart meter is asso-
ciated with a unique street address, however, data sent from the meter is
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (1970); ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); RANDALL P. BEZANSON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY REVISITED:
PRIVACY, NEWS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 1133 (1992).
23. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), the Court recognized the "individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," although it found there that the statute at issue did not "pose
a sufficiently grievous threat" to that interest.
24. Some jurisdictions require the electric utility to read residential meters each month; other
jurisdictions permit the utility to send estimated monthly bills with actual meter readings occurring less
frequently.
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personally identifiable.25 All smart meters permit the electric utility to re-
motely monitor electricity consumption not just monthly-but on a real-
time or near real-time basis. 26 Depending on the meter, this is at least as
frequently as hourly and often as frequently as every fifteen minutes, with
some meters measuring usage in five minute intervals. 27
The real-time monitoring can also occur by room, by appliance, and
potentially by outlet--depending on the types of appliances in the home
and the additional devices that form part of the HAN-and it is estimated
that the monitoring for an average home will generate between 750 and
3,000 data points per month.28 Because appliances (including heating and
cooling systems, refrigerators, toasters, hair dryers, computers, and home
entertainment centers) account for sixty to ninety percent of residential
energy usage, managing their energy consumption can greatly impact the
energy load at any time of day. 29 Manufacturers have begun to make more
and more of these appliances grid-enabled-that is, smart appliances-by
enabling them to communicate with smart meters. The appliances conti-
nually send their energy usage, labeled as consumed by that appliance, to
the smart meter. The smart meter reads that communication from all smart
appliances and can generate a load signature for each home. 30 A resident
can then view the home's detailed energy usage on an in-home display
(although there might be an additional charge for this) or on the electric
utility's secure website using unique login information and make informed
decisions on how to adjust energy usage.31 The resident or electric compa-
ny can relay instructions to the smart appliances either manually or auto-
25. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID
INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS, RELEASE 1.0, at 38, available at
http://www.nist.gov/public affairs/releases/upload/smartgridinteroperabilityfinal.pdf.
26. OE Recovery Act - Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
http://www.oe.energy.gov/recovery/1225.htm (last visited July 29, 2010); see also Frank Hoss, Smart
Grid Data Management: 7 Tips from the Trenches, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (June 2, 2010),
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/BusinessStrategyResources/Smart-Meter-Data-
Management-7-Essential-Tips-from-the-Trenches-2445.html.
27. See Auburn, Indiana, picks 5-minute intervals for use reporting, SMARTGRIDTODAY, (De-
cember 23, 2009), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/1079.cfm?sd=35; Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, SMART GRID CITY, http://smartgridcity.xcelenergy.com/learn/frequently-asked-questions.asp
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010); Frequently Asked Questions, SMART METER TEXAS,
https://www.smartmetertexas.com/CAP/public/learnmore/learn more-faq.html.
28. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 43.
29. End Use: Appliances, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM,
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/EndUse Appliances/ (last visited July 30, 2010).
30. Lillie Coney, Privacy and the Smart Grid: How to Address Consumer Concerns without
Jeopardizing the Growth of the Grid, Presentation at Smart Grid Summit, at 8-9 (April 13, 2010) (on
file with author), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/smartgrid/EPIC_StatementSmart Grid SummitCybersecurity andPrivacy.pd
f.
3 1. Smart Gid City, supra note 27; Smart Meter Texas, supra note 27.
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matically based on a pre-established algorithm to the smart meter.32 In
addition, anyone with access to a resident's display or the website could
review the load signature to determine what time the person arrives and
leaves home, if the security system is activated, if one cooks with a micro-
wave or the stove, the presence of certain medical equipment, how much
and when the household watches television, if someone gets up in the mid-
dle of the night and uses the computer, which equipment is left on 24/7,
etc. 33
The energy consumption of a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV)
could also be monitored by the smart meter. Because each PHEV likely
will be "registered" to a home electric account, smart meter data would
show when and how much a person's vehicle is charged, as well as where it
is charged. 34 If someone visits a friend and charges his PHEV there, the
friend's smart meter log would show when the visitor's car was there and
for how long it was charged. 35 By compiling information from various
smart meters, one could reconstruct a person's travel habits.
Utilities have also begun to encourage residential customers with
smart meters to install home energy management systems (EMS). 36 The
home EMS connects to the smart meter and is designed to enable a custom-
er to manage the HAN, which consists of smart appliances, PCTs, intelli-
gent sockets, in-home displays, and other smart in-home devices. 37 While
many of these systems and devices are still in their infancy, programs like
the Smart Grid Investment Grant awards are accelerating their develop-
ment. Near real-time data on people's activities within their homes-
information that has never before been available to people other than those
in the home-is quickly becoming available.38 Because myriad other sys-
tems that will interact with smart meters have yet to be designed, one can-
not fully predict the types and amounts of personally identifiable
information that will be monitored or collected.39 Utilities might argue that
32. Smart Meter Texas, supra note 27; see also
NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note I1, at 33.
33. Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 8-10.
34. William Levis, Smart Privacy for a Smart Grid at 9, Smart Grid Today Web Conference (April
13, 2010) (on file with author); see also NISTFramework, supra note 25, at 35.
35. Levis, supra note 34, at 9.
36. Smart Meter Texas, supra note 27; see also NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra
note 11, at 22.
37. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 22, 44; see also Press Release,
Cisco, Cisco Powers up Energy Management Tools for Utilities, Consumers, Businesses, (June 29,
2010) (on file with author), available at
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2010/prod 062910c.html?print-true; NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND
TECH., supra note 10, at 64.
38. Coney, supra note 30, at 9-10.
39. Levis, supra note 34, at 20.
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the monitoring of detailed data captured through the smart meters does not
present great cause for concern because utilities have both privacy policies
and staff in place to address security issues. The sheer volume and types of
personal data to be collected by smart meters, however, are far more threat-
ening to privacy than how much energy a household consumes on a
monthly basis, and the security issues themselves are different. Further-
more, as Polonetsky points out, security is not synonymous with privacy. 40
That is not to say that security is not an issue for those concerned
about privacy risks associated with smart meters. NIST, which was charged
with developing national standards for the smart grid, treats privacy as a
component of what it views as the much larger issue-cyber security.41
Utilities are using the Internet and public networks for transfer of smart
meter data.42 There is a strong push to increase the use of commercial
broadband, instead of utility-owned wires, for the transfer of smart meter
data back to the utilities. 43 Right now, residents in states like California and
Texas, where the smart meter rollout has been underway for a couple of
years, must access utility websites to view data generated by their own
smart meters.44 Whenever personal information is accessible on the Inter-
net, there is a concern about privacy because of breaches in security. Hack-
ers and unauthorized users could use the wealth of smart meter personal
data to enable crimes like identity theft, burglary, vandalism, stalking, and
domestic abuse. 45 Even if residents can access their smart meter data via
the in-home display of a home EMS, with the data relayed to the utility on
utility-owned wires, the HANs will rely on wireless technology given its
low cost compared to wires, making the data vulnerable. 46 Cryptographic
and physical controls, while certainly a deterrent to unauthorized access,
are not foolproof mechanisms to war driving, man-in-the-middle attacks,
and impersonators. 47 At a security conference in 2009, one security consul-
40. Privacy Advocate Details Weaknesses in Smart Grid, Utility Leadership, SMARTGRIDTODAY
(March 10, 2010), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/1338print.cfm.
41. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 5.
42. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 20.
43. FCC Broadband Plan Urges New Energy Data Policies at FERC, DOE, SMARTGRIDTODAY
(March 17, 2010), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/1363print.cfm.
44. Smart Grid City, supra note 27; Smart Meter Texas, supra note 27.
45. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 19.
46. Id. at 38; see also 2010 Smart Grid Industry Survey: Executive Summary, AVIAT NETWORKS,
www.portals.aviatnetworks.com/exLink.asp?88844410V23D86I36231748 (on file with author) (not-
ing that "[s]urvey results indicate that wireless technologies are considered very important elements of
Smart Grid programs").
47. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 38.
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tant demonstrated how he and his team could use a worm to take over the
smart meters in 15,000 out of 22,000 homes within twenty-four hours.48
Assuming the risks of criminal attacks could be made negligible
through enhanced cyber-security, authorized access to the smart meter data
also poses threats. Utilities themselves could pose a threat to the privacy of
the data. In the past, only those utility employees with access to certain
components of billing data could see confidential information about cus-
tomers, but the unprecedented volume of personal user data emerging from
the smart meters is of great value to myriad utility employees charged with
monitoring and maintaining the smart grid and managing electricity con-
sumption. Electric utilities will need new policies and procedures concern-
ing personnel hiring and training, more complex access and authorization
algorithms, and greatly enhanced privacy policies to minimize the possi-
bility of intentional and inadvertent disclosures of personal data.49 Addi-
tionally, electric utilities are already distributing energy usage comparisons
to customers.50 Current utility mechanisms to protect privacy are not suffi-
cient.
Electric utilities have begun struggling to determine which third party
vendors should have access to smart meter data and the extent to which the
utilities can control what third party vendors do with the data. Companies
that manufacturer home EMS and in-home display systems are actively
marketing their products to utilities for distribution to the electric compa-
ny's residential customers.51 These vendors include companies that tradi-
tionally rely on a business-to-business sales model, like Cisco, OPower and
General Electric, as well as companies that have had great success selling
to end users, like Google and Microsoft. 52 The latter two companies are
using a push-pull marketing strategy to promote their Google PowerMeter
and Microsoft Hohm systems to residential end users, while also complet-
ing sales directly to electric utilities. The relationships between the home
EMS manufacturers, utilities, and other third parties that offer complemen-
48. Katie Fehrenbacher, Smart Meter Worm Could Spread like a Virus, GIGAOM (July 31, 2009),
http://gigaom.com/cleantech/smart-meter-worm-could-spread-like-a-virus/ (on file with author).
49. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 8, App. C.
50. Julie Wernau, ComEd to Sample Power by the Hour, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2010 (News), at 19,
21.
51. New Cisco Offerings Focus on the Home, SMARTGRIDTODAY (June 30, 2010),
http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/1762print.cfm; see also Jeff St. John, Microsoft Hohm: First
Seattle City Light, Now Xcel Energy, GREEN LIGHT (November 12, 2009),
http://greentechmedia.com/green-light/post/microsoft-hohm-first-seattle-city-light-now-xcel-energy/.
52. See St. John, supra note Sl; GOOGLE POWERMETER,
http://www.google.com/powermeter/about/ (last visited July 29, 2010); OPower's 3.0 Upgrade Gives




tary devices and systems are becoming increasingly complex with smart
meter data flowing back and forth between the companies. 53 This data
transfer is occurring even before comprehensive privacy policies are in
place.
Once the data reaches a third party's servers, the third party typically
has control over how it uses and shares that data. Microsoft Hohm, for
example, allows the general public to click on a specific house on a map
and see the electric usage for that house.54 At this point, the energy usage
data shared is at a high level and Microsoft's privacy statement asserts that
it will not disclose an end user's personal data outside of the Microsoft
family of subsidiaries, affiliates, and companies with whom it co-brands
without the user's consent. 55 That family is quite large and difficult to dis-
cern for the general public, and Microsoft can always change its privacy
statement. Furthermore, the companies that co-brand with home EMS pro-
viders could include a host of companies that wish to market their products
directly to residents with smart meters. 56 These companies are confident
that "they can make a profit in the smart grid information area but their
business models will rely on getting" smart meter data. 57 While some con-
sumers might appreciate this service in the same way that they enjoy sug-
gestions for additional purchases from Amazon.com, Netflix, or Tivo, other
consumers will find yet more unsolicited advertising burdensome and inva-
sive-especially when they did not give the marketers permission to solicit
them. This invasion is likely to occur because some third party companies
having strong involvement with smart devices for the homes have not even
formed privacy policies or communicated them to end users. For example,
the chief executive officer of OPower, a smart grid and energy efficiency
software company that works with twenty-six utilities, states that he has not
yet had to deal with privacy concerns, adding that "[t]he way we've antic-
ipated dealing with them is to opt-out customers who are unhappy with the
analysis." 58
Electric utilities not only lack the ability to control the privacy policies
and procedures of third parties with whom they affiliate, but they also can-
not control access to smart meter data at cu stomers' homes. In the case of
53. See St. John, supra note 51.
54. See MICRosoFT HOHM BETA, http://www.microsoft-hohm.com/ (last visited August 1, 2010).
55. Microsoft Online Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/fullnotice.mspx#EWB (last updated August 2010).
56. Leslie Harris, Smart Grid: Classic Struggle of Reward vs. Risk, HUFFINGTON POST, (Decem-
ber 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leslie-harris/smart-grid-classic-struggb_387446.html.
57. Privacy Advocates Describe Pros, Cons of Consent to Use Meter Data, SMARTGRIDTODAY,
(December 18, 2009), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/1064print.cfi.
58. OPower's 3.0 Upgrade Gives Utility Customers Data They Can Actually Use, supra note 52.
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smart meters installed in buildings with multiple dwelling units, landlords
and subsequent renters or tenants might be able to access another resident's
smart meter data.59 If smart meters are not wiped clean of data between
tenants, a subsequent tenant could view the previous tenant's personal data.
A landlord could also access the data and use it to claim that a tenant is in
violation of a lease.
Other third parties might seek to obtain smart meter data from the res-
idential end user directly as a precondition to signing a contract or via dis-
covery in a legal dispute. Appliance manufacturers could determine usage
patterns for their appliances and use that data to invalidate warranties. 60
Similarly, car manufacturers would find the data helpful in resolving war-
ranty claims. Health insurance companies could want access to determine if
an insured party has an unhealthy lifestyle. 61 Financial institutions might
find it beneficial to know if a potential mortgagor is living full-time at a
location.62 Divorce attorneys might want to use the data to discredit the
opposing party in any number of ways, for example, by showing repeated
premarital visits to a lover.
Law enforcement officials constitute yet another group that will want
access to smart meter data. In fact, in some areas of the country, law en-
forcement agencies have already used energy consumption data as part of
an early investigational tool into potential illegal activities. In Texas, a
police detective allegedly used Austin Energy to help data-mine energy
usage to identify possible residential marijuana growing operations.63 In
California, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant based solely
on an unusually high electric bill to access a family's house in search of
evidence of marijuana production.64 It turned out that the family in ques-
tion simply used a lot of energy.65 In both cases, the alleged data-mining
focused on overall electricity consumption in excess of average. Smart
meter data would allow for much more focused investigations because
consumption could potentially be tracked by appliance and time of day.
Use of smart meter data could help law enforcement solve crimes, of
59. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 203.
60. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 112-13; see also Rebecca Herold,
Smart Grid Privacy Concerns, REBECCA HEROLD & ASSOCIATES (October
2009)http://www.privacyguidance.com/files/SmartGrid PrivacyHeroldOct2009.pdf.
61. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 55; see also Herold, supra note 60.
62. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 55.
63. Jordan Smith, APD Pot-Hunters Are Data-Mining at AE, AUSTIN CHRONICLE, November 16,
2007, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid=oid%3A561535





course. One could also argue that there would likely be only a few isolated
instances of misuse. On the other hand, there is a history of voluntary utili-
ty compliance with government requests to share personal consumer usage
information, such as by the phone companies after 9/11.66
Even if electric utilities do not voluntarily disclose detailed personal
consumption from smart meters to law enforcement, the government may
force the disclosure. In early 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice asserted
in federal court that no constitutional bar exists to law enforcement obtain-
ing cell phone records from communication service providers, arguing that
"[t]he government is not required to use a warrant when it uses a tracking
device." 67 The Department asserted that law enforcement needs only a
2703(d) order, which requires that the records are "relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation." 68 The U.S. Supreme Court has held,
however, that the warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside a house vi-
olates the Fourth Amendment.69 Smart meter data, which "tracks" energy
usage, is generated inside the house but conveyed to the electric utility, so
whether or not law enforcement may monitor it as a "tracking device"
without a search warrant is unclear. Concerns about the privacy implica-
tions of law enforcement access to smart grid meter are real and suggest the
need for strong Fourth Amendment protections. 70
Given the value of smart meter data to a variety of groups, as detailed
above, residential electricity consumers are justifiably concerned about the
lack of control over personal information that smart meter installation
presents. Some argue that clarification about who owns the data might put
these concerns to rest. Reaching that clarification will not be simple. In the
February 19, 2010, issue of the Federal Register, the executive branch's
Office of Science and Technology Policy requested public comment on the
first release of a smart grid interoperability framework document issued by
NIST. 71 The request encouraged potential responders to answer several
specific questions, including: "Who owns the home energy usage data?
Should individual consumers and their authorized third-party service pro-
66. In re: National Security Agency Telecomm. Records Litigation, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); see also Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Maysie Database ofAmenicans'Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May
11, 2006, amilable at http//ww.usatoday.connewswashington200605-10-nsaxihtm.
67. Declan McCullagh, Justice Dept. Defends Warrantless Cell Phone Tracking, CNET NEWS
(February 13, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10453214-38.html.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
70. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 55-56.
71. Consumer Interface with the Smart Grid, 75 Fed. Reg. 7526-28 (2010).
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viders have the right to access energy usage data directly from the me-
ter?" 72
No consensus exists regarding smart meter data ownership. Some par-
ties take the position that the individual energy consumer owns the data.
For example, the Texas Utilities Code states that "[a]ll meter data, includ-
ing all data generated, provided, or otherwise made available, by advanced
meters and meter information networks, shall belong to a customer, includ-
ing data used to calculate charges for service, historical load data, and any
other proprietary customer information." 73 NIST, on the other hand, states
that utilities own the data generated by the smart meters analogous to a car
rental company's ownership of data regarding car rentals.74 NIST also
points out that, even if the consumer were to own the smart meter data,
disputes as to the true consumer's identity may arise. Both a home owner
and a renter of the home could claim ownership of the usage data.75 Some
utilities argue that they have at least some ownership rights in the data. One
California utility, for example, argues that, while the customer possesses
the right to decide if he wants to release his smart meter data to a third par-
ty, the utility would be due "some consideration" at that point the data is
released. 76 The Public Service Company of Colorado believes that "the
energy usage information should be viewed as the property of the utility"
and that the COPUC must provide the utility with a mechanism for reco-
vering the costs associated with disclosure of customer data to third parties
upon the customer's written request.77 Senator Mark Udall's proposed
amendment to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, S. 3487,
states that electric consumers have a right to access smart meter data and
"retain the privacy of [their] electric energy information," but does not
address the issue of data ownership. 78Even a resolution to the ownership
controversy in favor of the consumer, however, does not ensure control
over personal data. Were consumers to own the smart meter data and have
the power to authorize or refuse disclosure to third parties, the data remains
subject to security breaches, inadvertent disclosure by the utility, and un-
knowingly authorized releases by the consumer to third parties-all of
which would result in personal data reaching possibly unsecured areas on
72. Id. at 7527.
73. Tex. Utilities Code § 39.107(b).
74. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note I1, at 114.
75. Id.
76. Burbank Municipal Utility Manger Tackles Issue, SMARTGRIDTODAY (September 21, 2009),
http://www.smartgridtoday.com/members/755print.cfm.
77. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO, supra note 10, at 12.
78. S. 3487, 11Ith Cong. § 2 (2010); see also H. R. 4860, 11Ith Cong. § 215 (2010) (a companion
bill in the House advanced by Representative Edward Markey).
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the Internet, where it might reside permanently. As George Washington
University law professor Jeffrey Rosen recently stated that "the permanent
memory bank of the Web increasingly means there are no second
chances."79 Rosen noted that a group of experts in technology, the law, and
cyberspace are currently exploring options for "recreating the possibility of
digital forgetting," but for now personal data that finds its way to unsecured
areas of the Internet will be beyond the data owner's control and forever
accessible to the general public.80
Control over personal data might also be lost through the aggregation
of non-personal data with publicly available data. A recent study conducted
at Carnegie Mellon University demonstrated how one can predict individu-
als' social security numbers within very narrow ranges using only public
data.8 ' A variation on the phenomenon of obtaining personal data by ag-
gregating non-personal and public data is "trail identification." Experts
have shown that, by using algorithms, one can learn an individual's identity
"from the trails of seemingly anonymous" data that they leave behind when
they visit the Internet. 82 In relation to smart meters, participants in the
NIST Cyber Security Working Group express a strong concern that com-
bining publicly available personal information with seemingly anonymous
smart meter data elements might reveal personal, undisclosed lifestyle in-
formation. 83 For example, Google could use smart meter data obtained
from its PowerMeters with information obtained from Google's other In-
ternet ventures to generate powerful personal information about PowerMe-
ter users. 84
III. LACK OF CONSUMER OPTIONS
One solution to these myriad threats to privacy might be to simply
refuse to allow smart meter installation in your home, but electric consum-
ers have no truly viable options. With the exception of a very few who have
chosen to live outside the mainstream of American life, we rely on electric-
ity in this country. We need it to light our homes, to utilize heating and air
conditioning, to run our computers, to run our microwaves, to enjoy our
79. Jeffrey Rosen, The End ofForgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 25, 2010, at 32.
80. Id. at 34.
81. Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public Data,
106 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 10975-80, available at www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/l 0.1073/pnas.0904891106.
82. Bradley Malin, Latanya Sweeney, & Elaine Newton, Trail Re-identification: Learning Who
You Are from Where You Have Been, CARNEGIE MELLON DATA PRIVACY LAB (Data Privacy Lab.
Tech. Report, Pittsburgh),(March 2003),
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/trails/trailsl.pdf.
83. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note I1, at I10.
84. Coney, supra note 30, at 11-12.
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televisions and entertainment centers, and to recharge our cell phones. We
cannot imagine life without it-except for the recreational or educational
trip to a community that reflects the realities of life before electricity be-
came widely available. As electric utilities receive permission from their
state public utility commissions to replace traditional meters with smart
meters and expand their rollout, the utilities will cease servicing traditional
meters and consumers will need to permit the installation of a smart meter
in their homes if they want to continue to receive electricity.85 Unlike cell
phones or credit cards, consumers cannot opt out of the technology or de-
cide which smart meter to have installed.
The notice and consent model employed to let consumers know what
happens with the data from their smart meters also severely limits or nulli-
fies options. Once a smart meter is installed and consumers are asked to set
up an online account for secure access to data from the smart meter, they
will typically need to "click" their consent to an agreement. That agreement
might contain a utility's "terms and conditions" and privacy statement,
including information on the utility's procedures for and the consumer's
consent to disclosure of smart meter data.86 Lillie Coney, associate director
of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), noted in comments
before the U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology that studies
indicate that people do not read agreements, privacy statements, or other
disclaimers before downloading or activating Internet programs. 87 In fact,
the majority of people mistakenly believe that the presence of a privacy
statement automatically means that their privacy is protected.88 Another
study conducted for the Privacy Leadership Initiative found that the vast
majority of people do not read or only glance at privacy notices sent to
them.89 In the case of a click-through agreement for one's own smart me-
ter, consumers will likely feel that they have no choice because they need
electricity. As Coney pointed out, "You're talking about my ability to get
electricity... . If I don't consent to it, the utility may not give me power?
That's a very scary choice." 90 While debate continues over the adequacy of
the notice and consent model, NIST appears inclined to recommend that
85. Residents Express Concern over SmartMeter Radiation, KGO-TV (July 29, 2010),
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section-news/business&id=7583605.
86. See, e.g., Smart Grid City, supra note 3; Smart Grid Texas, supra note 27.
87. Lillie Coney, Comments Before the House Committee on Science and Technology, 16 (July 1,
2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/smartgrid/SmartGridTestimony_2010-07-01.pdf.
8 8. Id.
89. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, PRIVACY LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE: PRIVACY NOTICES RESEARCH FINAL
RESULTS, (December 2001), available at
http://www.bbbonline.org/understandingprivacy/library/datasum.pdf.
90. Privacy Advocates Describe Pros, Cons of Consent to Use Meter Data, supra note 57.
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utilities implement clear notice and consent procedures related to the smart
meter data they collect and disclose.91
IV. CURRENT LACK OF ADEQUATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Given the lack of options consumers have to address the seriousness
of privacy risks inherent in smart meters,. one needs to look elsewhere for
privacy protection. As noted earlier, the past forty years have seen a proli-
feration of statutes addressing information privacy. These statutes, howev-
er, do not adequately protect electric consumers from the specific threats to
privacy generated by residential smart meters.
The U.S. Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 to require the use
of "fair information practices," including eight principles:
1. There shall be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very ex-
istence is secret ....
2. An individual about whom information is maintained. . . shall have a
right to to see and copy that information.
3. An individual about whom information is maintained ... shall have a
right to correct or amend the substance of the information.
4. There shall be limits on the types of information an organization may
collect about an individual ....
5. There shall be limits on the internal uses of information about an indi-
vidual ....
6. There shall be limits on the external disclosures of information about
an individual ....
7. A record-keeping organization [must establish] reasonable and proper
information management policies and practices ....
8. A record-keeping organization shall be accountable for its personal-
data record-keeping policies, practices, and systems. 92
These requirements would certainly help to assuage the privacy risks of
smart meter data, and privacy organizations such as EPIC advocate their
adoption in this regard. 93 The requirements do not have the force of law
against utility companies, however, let alone third parties involved in the
smart meter industry because the Privacy Protection Act of 1974 applies
only to federal agencies. 94 Of the more than 3,200 traditional electric utili-
ties in the United States, only nine are federal utilities and potentially sub-
ject to this law.95
91. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note I1, at 105.
92. Gellman, supra note 18, at 3-4; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
93. Coney, Comments Before the House Committee, supra note 85, at 12-14.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (2010); 5 USCS § 551(1) (2010).
95. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 2007, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html.
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Two chapters within the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA) might provide some protection against privacy risks inherent
in smart meters. The Wiretap Act (18 USC §§ 2510-2522) prohibits the
intentional interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic commu-
nications, making such action a crime. 96 An "electronic communication" is
defined by the Act as
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelli-
gence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, elec-
tromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include:
(A) any wire or oral communication [with wire communication meaning
aural transmissions];
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section
3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution
in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer
of funds. 97
The transmission of smart meter data either via the electric utility's
wires or other broadband wire or via wireless technology falls within this
definition. Therefore, hackers, war drivers, and other unauthorized users
who access smart meter data as it is being transmitted either to the utility or
to an in-home display-or subsequently disclose or use the data knowing it
has been intercepted-violate the Act. The Wiretap Act also appears to
prohibit law enforcement officials from intercepting without a warrant the
smart meter data while it is in transit, unless such official is conducting
"electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978, as authorized by that Act." 98
These examples of violations of the Act are not surprising, but the Act
provides a few interesting exceptions to the prohibition on interception, as
related to smart meter data. It states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color
of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such
person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception. 99
The same exception is granted to a person "not acting under color of
law .. . unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of com-
mitting any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution of laws
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2010).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2010).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (2010).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2010).
2011] 177
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of the United States or of any State."100 Because the electric utility is one
of the parties to the electronic communication, that is, the transmission of
the smart meter data to the utility, the Wiretap Act appears to allow a utility
to give permission to law enforcement or a third party to intercept the smart
meter data.
The Wiretap Act further provides the following:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switch-
board, or an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electron-
ic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission
of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged
in an activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his ser-
vice ... .101
This provision also could permit disclosure of smart meter data by the
electric utility to a third party with whom the utility has contracted to pro-
vide some aspect of the smart meter service, for example, to a home EMS,
as long as the electric utility is an "electronic communication service." The
ECPA defines an "electronic communication service," as "any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or elec-
tronic communications."1 02 An electronic communication service must be
more than operation of a website. 103 Traditional electric utilities likely do
not meet the definition of an electronic communication service, but an elec-
tric utility that provides users the ability to send smart meter data to the
utility and then instructions back to smart appliances arguably fits the defi-
nition. This would mean, however, that the electric utility is both the pro-
vider of the service and a recipient of communications using the service.
The applicability of this definition to an electric utility providing smart
meter service has not yet been tested in the courts. If there is a match, then
the Wiretap Act permits the electric utility to share smart meter data with
third parties who are necessary to the provision of the smart meter service,
although it is unclear who will decide which third parties are necessary.
These exceptions suggest that, without further clarification by the courts,
the Wiretap Act will not adequately protect the information privacy of con-
sumers with smart meters in their homes.
Another chapter of the ECPA (18 USC §§ 2701-2709), known as the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), might be an alternative guarantor of
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2010).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2010).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2010).
103. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 307 (E.D. N.Y. 2005).
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privacy protection for smart meter data. The Act addresses the unlawful
access to stored communications. Its prohibitions include:
1. a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to
the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the con-
tents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service; and
2. a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public
shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any
communication which is carried or maintained on that service-
(A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from
(or created by means of computer processing or communications re-
ceived by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or cus-
tomer of such service; . . . and
3. a provider of remote computing service or electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other infor-
mation pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not in-
cluding the contents of communications covered by paragraph (1) or (2))
to any governmental entity. 104
Whether or not these prohibitions apply to an electric utility depends on
whether an electric utility can be classified as an entity providing "electron-
ic communication service to the public." 05
As discussed above, an electric utility providing smart meter service
arguably is an electronic communication service, although this premise has
not been tested in the courts. The SCA further requires, however, that this
service be provided "to the public." One court found that, while the statute
does not define "public," the term is unambiguous and means the "aggre-
gate of citizens" or "the community at large."l 06 If the electric utility is
providing smart meter service, including the communication of data to and
from the utility, to the community where it offers electric service and if that
community must get its electric service from that utility, the electric utility
then provides "electronic communication service to the public." That ser-
vice is an integral part of the utility's business.
Assuming for the moment that the SCA's general prohibitions apply
to electric utilities providing smart meter service, one must still determine
whether any of the SCA's exceptions to the prohibitions apply. Under the
statute, a provider of an electronic communication service to the public
may disclose the contents of a communication:
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2010).
105. Whether or not these prohibitions apply to a third party provider of smart meter data analysis
(e.g., a home energy management service) will depend on whether the third party can be classified as a
remote computing service. However, before addressing that issue, which is more tenuous, one needs to
address whether the electric utility can disclose smart meter data to the third party, and this article will
focus on the latter.
106. Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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(1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an
agent of such addressee or intended recipient; . . . [or]
(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended
recipient of such communication; . . . [or]
(5) as may be necessary incident to the rendition of the service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.107
The electric utility is arguably the intended recipient of the smart me-
ter data when it is sent from the consumer's home to the utility. As long as
there is no interdiction against being both the provider of the service and an
intended recipient of a communication,10 8 then the utility may disclose the
contents of smart meter data to one of its agents, for example, a third party
vendor of a home EMS or related smart meter devices, either because that
third party provider is an agent or because the utility, as intended recipient,
lawfully consents to the disclosure. Even if the utility were found not to be
an intended recipient, it could still disclose the data to a third party if doing
so were necessary to providing the full smart meter service, including data
analysis, to its electric customers. The utility could disclose the smart meter
data to a law enforcement or governmental agency, however, only if the
utility "in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death
or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure" or the utility is
presented with a valid warrant, with limited exceptions.109
If the conditional conclusions stated above are true, then the SCA of-
fers very little privacy protection relative to smart meter data. Given the
newness of smart meters, however, uncertainties exist regarding the electric
utility's classification as an electronic service provider, the application of
the term "public" to the population required to participate in smart meter
electric service, and the possibility of being simultaneously an electronic
service provider and an intended recipient of smart meter data. These un-
certainties make it impossible to determine whether the SCA offers any
protection from the disclosure of intimate personal data from smart meters.
Two other federal statutes that could offer a modicum of information
privacy protection for smart meter customers include the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA) and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTC Act). The CFAA provides for criminal penalties in the case of
intentional unauthorized access (or access that exceeds authorization) of
certain computers, including "protected" computers.I1 0 A "protected com-
puter" may be one "which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2010).
108. As noted above, this conclusion has not been tested in the courts.
109. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2702(b)(8) (2010); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703(LEXIS 2010).
110. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(a)(2) (2010).
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communication."'II Because smart meters are part of a smart grid with
transmission wires crossing state lines (with the exceptions of Texas, Ha-
waii and Alaska1 12), interstate commerce is affected, so smart meters and
the utility servers that contain smart meter data would be protected com-
puters. The CFAA therefore clearly prohibits the criminal conduct of hack-
ers, war drivers, and rogue utility employees who intentionally exceed
authorized access certainly threaten the privacy of consumers' smart meter
data. The more insidious threats to information privacy posed by smart
meters-seemingly authorized conduct by utilities, law enforcement offi-
cials, and third parties-are not addressed by the CFAA.
Section 5 of the FTC could help to address some of the latter threats.
That statute states that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, are hereby declared unlawful." 1 3 The FTC has litigated cases to
enforce the promises companies make in their privacy statements, "includ-
ing promises about the security of consumers' personal information." 1 4
For this law to provide any real protection for electric consumers' personal
information, utilities and authorized third parties with access to smart meter
data must have privacy policies continually in place that truly do allow
consumers to have well-informed, proactive control over that data. No cur-
rent federal statutes consistently require such privacy policies or the poli-
cies contain serious exceptions, and, as noted supra, consumers rarely read
privacy statements-especially the fine print. Public utility commission
regulations may limit disclosures by utilities of personal information, but
such regulations also do not necessarily require utilities to have company
privacy policies. 115
When it comes to smart meter data, state laws and state regulatory re-
quirements-like federal statutes-do not provide adequate information
privacy protection. The results of NIST's privacy impact assessment reveal
that, "in general, state utility commissions currently lack formal privacy
policies or standards related to the Smart Grid." 1 6 Current public utility
111. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(e)(2) (2010).
112. The Texas Interconnected System is not interconnected with the Eastern or Western Intercon-
nected Systems, other two major interconnected power grids in the United States, (except by certain
direct current lines). U.S. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 95. However, almost all U.S. utilities are
interconnected with at least one other utility by the Eastern or Western Interconnected Systems except
for in Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2010).
114. Enforcing Privacy Promises: Section 5 of the FTC Act, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
http://www.flc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises.html.
115. See, e.g., Rule 4 CCR 723-1:1104.
116. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note I1, at 103.
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commission regulations, while possibly forbidding utilities from disclosing
a customer's personal information without customer permission, do not
define "personal information." For a traditional utility, a customer's per-
sonal information would be limited to customer name, address, possibly
social security number, and billing information. Smart meter data, as de-
tailed earlier in this article, reveal much more personal information. Cur-
rent commission regulations may also allow exceptions to disclosure. The
COPUC rules, for example, while prohibiting disclosure of personal infor-
mation to a third party without customer authorization, permit a utility to
disclose personal information requested by a federal, state, or local go-
vernmental agency including, but not limited to: the Commission; state
and local departments of social services; and federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. Written requests shall be on official letterhead. In
the case of a telephone request, the employee of the regulated entity shall
verify the caller's identity by obtaining the caller's office telephone
number and returning the call, unless the employee knows the caller is an
authorized governmental representative. A person requesting information
in person shall demonstrate that he or she properly represents a govern-
mental agency. 117
The rules do not limit the information that a governmental agency may
receive and do not require a warrant or court order. While the COPUC is
currently reviewing its regulations regarding smart meter data, law en-
forcement and other governmental agencies may currently obtain smart
meter data on 10,000 households where Xcel Energy has installed smart
meters and appliance control devices, using the data as they deem appro-
priate.
In Illinois, where 131,000 customers have smart meters, the Public
Utilities Act has similar disclosure provisions. The Act allows for general
customer usage to be disclosed, but forbids disclosure of "customer specific
billing, usage or load shape data" to alternative retail electric suppliers and
local units of government without customer authorization.118 However, it
permits disclosure to a customer's "agent" and appears to be silent on dis-
closure to other third parties.11 9 The Act does provide that a "public utility
shall not disclose customer record information to a law enforcement agency
unless the law enforcement agency requests the customer record informa-
tion in writing, specifying that the information is necessary for a law en-
forcement purpose."l 20 As in Colorado, the utility need not receive a
warrant or court order to release the personal information.
117. Rule 4 CCR 723-1:1104, supra note 115, at (d).
118. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-122 (2010).
119. Id.
120. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-110(2010).
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As more utilities install smart meters, more states and public utility
commissions will likely start reviewing and updating their laws and regula-
tions to address smart meter issues, like the privacy of smart meter data.
The results are unpredictable. In any case, the states' efforts might be irre-
levant given the interstate nature of the smart grid with transmission wires
crossing state lines. Furthermore, many individual utilities provide electric
service in more than one state and sometimes consolidate their billing oper-
ations in just one of the states they serve or even outsource their billing to
another state. Because interstate commerce is impacted, federal statutes
may pre-empt state laws and regulations.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
If existing statutes and regulations do not protect the privacy of smart
meter data that reveals activities occurring inside the home, perhaps the
Fourth Amendment offers some protection, at least against law enforce-
ment's unfettered access to the data. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 121
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld this right to be free from unrea-
sonable search and seizure, but the definition of "unreasonable" remains
fluid. In United States v. Katz, the Court held that what a person "seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be consti-
tutionally protected." 122 A concurring opinion in that case set out a twofold
requirement for reasonableness: (1) "[A] person [must] have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and (2) "the expectation [must]
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"l 23 A case
decided four years later explicitly stated that the Fourth Amendment "is
ruled by fluid concepts of 'reasonableness.'" 24 In 1979, the Court decided
that the subjective expectation that phone numbers--once dialed- will
remain private was not an expectation "that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable." 25 Seven years later, Congress enacted the Pen Register Act
as part of the ECPA to protect the privacy of outgoing phone numbers. As
technology evolved further, law enforcement agencies gained the capability
121. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
122. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
123. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
125. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
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of detecting activity within a home by using thermal imaging. In 2001, the
Court held that warrantless use of the technology to view inside a home
was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.126 Warning that use of thermal
imaging could disclose intimate details about personal activities, including
"at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and
bath," Justice Scalia opined that the Fourth Amendment "draws 'a firm line
at the entrance to the house.' That line, we think, must be not only firm but
also bright." 27 These cases generally suggest that the Fourth Amendment
would prohibit access by law enforcement to smart meter details that might
reveal intimate details about activities occurring within a customer's home.
The courts' interpretations of Fourth Amendment law, however, raise
two caveats. First, while Justice Scalia insisted in United States v. Kyllo
that a firm, bright line be drawn at the entrance to the house, he also stated
there that "'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a
search-at least where . .. the technology in question is not in general pub-
lic use."l 28 This caveat suggests that if a technology for seeing inside a
house is in "general public use," then that technology might invalidate so-
cietal willingness to accept the individual's expectation of privacy as rea-
sonable. As smart meters become more prevalent, with more than fifty
million installed by 2012, along with home EMSs that connect the smart
meters to smart appliances and other smart devices, it is foreseeable that
society could find it unreasonable to expect that one's electricity-
consuming activities inside the home would remain private.
Second, the Court "consistently has held that a person has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in information that he voluntarily turns over to
third parties." 29 This information may include "numerical information"
given to companies "in the ordinary course of business." 30 Courts reason
that, because there is no privacy interest in records kept in the course of a
business, individuals cannot challenge law enforcement's acquisition of
various types of information such as bank records, credit card statements,
and cell phone records.131 Using the same reasoning, courts have held that
individuals do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in utility
records-at least in the kilowatt consumption data contained in electric
126. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).
127. Id at 38-40 (citation omitted).
128. Id at 34. (citation omitted).
129. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
130. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111622, 25 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); United States v. Phibbs, 999
F.2d 1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hynson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67261, 15 (E.D.
Pa. 2007)
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utility records. 132 The court in one such case, however, qualified its reason-
ing by pointing out that the records contained only the amount of power
consumed and did not reveal "any intimate details of [defendant's] life."1 33
Given the rich detail of smart meter data, which can reveal intimate details
about the electric customer's life, and the reality that electric customers
have no true choice in whether or not to give the data to the utilities, courts
might find this data beyond the warrantless reach of law enforcement. On
the other hand, the data is part of the utility's business record, and as smart
meters become commonplace, courts could find that individuals cannot
realistically have an expectation of privacy in the data generated by the
meters-or, at least, an expectation that society will find reasonable.
VI. CURRENT THREATS AND LOOMING UNCERTAINTY BEG IMMEDIATE
ACTION
Given the unprecedented threats smart meters pose to the privacy of
activities that occur inside the home and the lack of protection provided by
current laws and regulations against these threats, new avenues of protec-
tion must be enacted now-before, as Quinn warned, "one really salient
privacy invasion . .. makes the front page of the New York Times and the
Washington Post" and brings smart grid development to an unplanned
halt.134 When faced with the same challenge in Ontario, Canada, where
every house in the province will have a smart meter by the end of 2010, the
province's information and privacy commissioner "put[] up a big stop
sign" until the province could implement a "privacy-by-design" approach
to smart meter data. 135 She explained that "[r]egulatory compliance often
comes in after the data breaches have happened.. . . I wanted the protec-
tions to be proactive and preventative."1 36 It is unwise to wait until some-
one uses personal smart meter data to imitate pleaserobme.com, a website
that aggregated and streamed information from various social networking
services that encouraged users to share their locations throughout the day,
revealing when their homes were unoccupied.137
132. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (D. Or. 2006); Samson v. State,
919 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. App. 1994);
Booker v. Dominion Va. Power, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44960, 17-18 (E.D. Va. 2010).
133. State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
134. Smart Grid Elevated to Top Issue by Leading Privacy Watchdogs, supra note 8.
135. Ontario's Privacy Commissioner Urges Halting Smart Grid, SMARTGRIDTODAY, (April 8,
2010), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/1447.cfmsd=31.
136. Id.
137. Please Rob Me: Site Tells the World When You're Not Home, HUFFINGTON POST, (April 19,
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/17/please-rob-me-site-tells_n_465966.html.
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Privacy advocates, governmental agencies, and those involved in the
booming smart meter industry generally agree on the need for some type of
action and have proposed various approaches. One approach is to rely on
the electric utilities to protect their customers' privacy. After all, they have
a great deal at stake in the success of smart meters. In comments on NIST's
first draft of the Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy and Requirements
interagency report, PEPCO, an electric company serving the District of
Columbia and parts of Maryland, suggested that "[t]he current process for
tariff approval adequately considers customer privacy." 38 Even NIST ap-
pears to support a modified version of this approach, noting the each organ-
ization should have its own disclosure requirements (subject to applicable
laws and regulations) and its own retention guidelines for smart meter da-
ta. 139 In addition, utilities must comply with their own published privacy
statements per the requirements of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
There are, however, several reasons reliance on utilities will not en-
sure privacy protection of customers' personal information from smart
meters. As virtual monopolies within their service areas, electric utilities
have limited incentives to appease consumers. While they might have much
at stake in the success of smart meters, the utilities' operating costs and
investments are reimbursed by ratepayers, greatly minimizing the utilities'
risk. The nature of utilities is also changing given the enormous amount of
personal information they are beginning to collect from customers. 140 As
Polonetsky points out, "Utilities understand the regulated environment and
basic security. But they have not been involved with issues such as profil-
ing, tracking and third-party data transfers because those have not been part
of their business models." 141 Compared to online companies, for example,
they have much less experience dealing with privacy issues. 142
Another approach is to develop and then rely on standards and rec-
ommended privacy practices-the focus of NIST.143 The president of the
IEEE Standards Association asserts that "[a]t the end of the day, it's all
about standards. If we get that right at the onset, we create an ecosystem for
138. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10, at 159.
139. Id at 7, 205.
140. Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: Achieving the Gold Standard in Data Protection for the
Smart Grid, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISIONER, ONTARIO, CANADA (June 2010) (on file with
author), http://www.ipc.on.calimages/Resources/achieve-goldstnd.pdf
141. Privacy Advocate Details Weaknesses in Smart Grid, supra note 40.
142. Susan Lyon, Privacy Lessons SmartGrid Should Take from Web 2.0, ELECTRIC LIGHT &
POWER (April 1, 2010), http://www.elp.com/index/display/article-display/9627238375/articles/utility-
automation-engineering-td/volume-15/Issue-4/Features/Privacy-Lessons-SmartGrid-Should-take-from-
WEB-20.html.
143. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 6-7, 10, 104-09.
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the development of technologies that will thrive in the present and fu-
ture."144 NIST's work is well researched. Its impressive working group
conducted a privacy impact assessment and considered more than 450
comments from privacy groups, utilities, technology firms, and other enti-
ties involved in the smart grid industry when compiling its second draft of
Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy and Requirements interagency report
(and is now working on a third version).145 The problem with relying on a
standards and privacy guidelines approach, however, is that the NIST re-
port contains only recommendations despite the term "requirements" in the
report's title. NIST clearly states this in the report itself, noting that the
report contains "suggested privacy practices," "regulations are outside the
scope" of the project, "enforcement is outside the scope," and the second
draft of the report "has been revised to clarify that the information is guid-
ance, not mandatory." 46 While NIST and others hope that state regulators
and the industry will embrace the guidelines, everyone is free to ignore
them or simply pick and choose the recommendations they like.
If relying solely on the utilities to ensure customer privacy is too risky
and the NIST guidelines are only that-guidelines-then perhaps a third
approach would work: look to the state public utility commissions to use
the NIST guidelines and regulate how electric utilities implement privacy
protections. One clear advantage to this approach is its ability to require
utility compliance because public utility commissions have regulatory au-
thority over utilities. As NIST observes, most commissions also have cus-
tomer privacy policies in place-albeit ones that pre-date smart meters-
and utilities take commission policies very seriously.147 In some states
where smart meter rollout started early, commissions have begun to update
their regulations and, as part of that process, are examining the issue of
customer privacy. For example, in August 2009, the COPUC opened a
docket in the matter and officially requested comments from interested
parties in February 2010.148 In response to state legislation, the Public Util-
ities Commission of the State of California also began a process in late
2008 to institute rulemaking to "Actively Guide Policy in California's De-
144. Chuck Adams, Smart Grid Standards: Why Are They Needed and How Will They Work?,
CONNECTED PLANET (April 7, 2010), http://connectedplanetonline.com/commentary/smart-grid-
standards-0407/.
145. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 5-6, App. G; Press Release, NIST
Released the Second Draft, supra note 16.
146. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 10,at 196, 199, 235.
147. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 11, at 103 n. 28.
148. Order Seeking Comments and Information: In the Matter of the Investigation of Security and
Privacy Concerns regarding the Deployment of Smart-Grid Technology, Decision No. C1O-0175,




velopment of a Smart Grid System" and issued a decision in June 2010.149
Public utility commissions in other states have received federal funding to
study the smart grid.' 50 As these studies progress, commissions will likely
generate smart-meter related rules governing electric utility conduct, which
the U.S. Supreme Court has termed "one of the most important of the func-
tions traditionally associated with the police power of the States." 5'
Some argue, however, that delegating the protection of customers'
privacy to state public utility commissions may not be adequate to ensure
their privacy given the unprecedented threats posed by smart meter data.
Inconsistencies could arise between state laws and commission regulations
because other state agencies often have responsibility for the enforcement
of state privacy laws.152 New commission regulations might not be suffi-
cient given the pressure commissions feel to support the smart meters from
federal and state governments, utility lobbyists, and third parties poised to
benefit from the installation of smart meters and related devices. For the
third parties, there is big money at stake, and these companies' business
models rely on obtaining smart meter data.153 In Colorado, for example, the
COPUC recognized the potential for trade-offs "between protecting privacy
and promoting innovation" and asked those commenting on proposed rules
for the deployment of smart meters to address the trade-offs.154 In October
2009, California's governor signed into law SB 17, mandating that the
state's public utility commission work with utilities to ensure that smart
meter deployment plans are ready for rollout in a fairly short timeframe.155
The commission specifically required the utilities to discuss in their dep-
loyment plans how they will "[e]nable maximum access by third parties to
the grid, creating a welcoming platform for deployment of a wide range of
energy technologies and management services."l 56 The commission also
acknowledged that it might need to review and approve individual utility
149. Decision Adopting Requirements for Smart Grid Deployment Plans Pursuant to Senate Bill 17
(Padilla), Chapter 327, Statutes Of 2009, Decision 10-06-047 (June 24, 2010), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINALDECISION/I 19902.htm [hereinafter Decision 10-06-
047].
150. Press Release, Illinois Commerce Commission, ICC Receives Federal Grant to Study Smart
Grid, Energy Reliability (June 21, 2010) (on file with author), available at
http://www.icc.illinois.gov/press/.
151. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983).
152. NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note I l,at 103; see also Decision 10-06-047,
supra note 149, at 43 n.90.
153. Alicia Caldwell, The Grid, DENVER POST, Dec. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci9 3972530.
154. Decision No. C09-0878, App. A (August 12, 2009), available at
http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/DocketsDecisions/HighprofileDockets/091-593EG.htm.
155. Decision 10-06-047, supra note 149, at 6.
156. Id. at 34.
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plans before the commission can "address customer access and specific
privacy and cyber security rules in a separate phrase." 57 Further, the com-
mission recognized that it may lack authority over third parties.158 Even if
all of these challenges could be overcome, the interstate nature of the smart
grid-and probable travel of smart meter data across state lines-might
negate the ability of state public utility commissions and legislatures to
address the privacy threats posed by smart meter data.
Another source for privacy protection could be federal legislation.
Historically, Congress has addressed gaps in laws generated by new tech-
nology. For example, after the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was not
reasonable to expect phone numbers once dialed to be private, Congress
passed the Pen Register Act,159 although confusion still exists regarding
reasonable privacy expectations for cordless phones.160 Congress also has
enacted legislation when issues implicate interstate commerce, such as the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires telecommunications car-
riers to obtain customer authorization before disclosing "customer proprie-
tary network information" (CPNI).161 The Act defines CPNI as
(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type,
destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service
subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that
is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the
carrier-customer relationship; and
(B) information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange
service or telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier.162
Smart-meter data bears strong similarities to CPNI, suggesting that
federal legislation as related to electric utilities would be appropriate. Fur-
thermore, federal agencies have already entered the fray regarding use of
the smart grid, such as NIST's work on interoperability standards, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rulemaking that is to follow
the conclusion of NIST's work, and the Federal Communication Commis-
sion (FCC) National Broadband Plan.163
157. Id. at42, 121.
158. Id. at 42-43.
159. Pen Register - Further Readings, http://Iaw.jrank.org/pages/9137/Pen-Register.html (last
visited July 30, 2010)
160. Frierson v. Goetz, 99 Fed. Appx. 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2004).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2010).
162. 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1) (2010).
163. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, SMART GRID STANDARDS ADOPTION: STAFF UPDATE
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/07-15-
10-smart-grid.pdf; BROADBAND.GOv, NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN: 12.1 BROADBAND AND THE
SMART GRID, available at http://www.broadband.gov/plan/12-energy-and-the-environment/#sl2-1 (last
visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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While the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
urges Congress and federal agencies to "respect and incorporate State rules
and ongoing State authority to protect ratepayers' privacy" and wants to
limit federal agency involvement to setting voluntary standards, neither
seems likely to occur. 164 Several pieces of legislation are now pending
related to the smart grid. The proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2009 man-
dates NIST to recommend standards for cyber security and allocates funds
to the National Science Foundation for research on how to guarantee indi-
vidual privacy in cyberspace.165 It also requires the President to review
existing federal privacy laws, such as the ECPA, and report to Congress. 166
None of these provisions actually provides specific protection of smart
meter data; in fact, the proposed act gives the Secretary of Commerce
"access to all relevant data concerning such networks without regard to any
provision of law, regulation, rule, or policy restricting such access."167 Two
companion bills in Congress, S. 3487 and H. R. 5696, both known as the
"e-KNOW Act," give each consumer who has a smart meter the right to
access the data generated by the smart meter in that consumer's home, with
the House bill also limiting the utility's ability to disclose the data to third
parties and prohibiting any third party's disclosure of the data without the
consumer's informed, written consent. 168 The future of these Congressional
bills is uncertain, but they might set a floor for privacy protection related to
smart meter data upon which state legislation, like California's SB 837, can
build.
As the national rollout of smart meters continues state by state with
the addition to HANs of smart appliances, home EMS, and other smart
devices, the data collected and shared will pose unprecedented threats to
the privacy most Americans expect to enjoy in their homes. Yet Americans
cannot simply refuse smart meters and disconnect themselves from the
electric grid. Current laws and regulations do not adequately protect their
privacy; in fact, a series of U.S. court cases suggests that electric consum-
ers do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in utility records.
While standards currently being developed, updates to individual electric
company privacy policies, and yet-to-be-determined state regulations might
offer a modicum of protection, new federal legislation specifically address-
164. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, COMMITTEE
RESOLUTIONS 17 (July 21, 2010), available at
http://summer.narucmeetings.org/201 OSummerFinalResolutions.pdf.
165. S.773, 11Ith Cong. §§ 6(a), ll(a)(4)(2009).
166. Id. § 16.
167. Id. § 14(b)(1).
168. S. 3487, 111th Cong. (2010); H. R. 5696, 11th Cong. (2010); available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cl 11 :H.R.5696:.
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ing smart meter data might be the only route to ensure that Americans truly
have in the future a right to privacy in their homes.

